In Defense of Wittgenstein’s Therapeutic Philosophy

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Abstract: Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is accused of being an uncritical philosophy. This allegation is raised by Critical Theory and specifically by Matthew Crippen. Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy purportedly redacts any critique towards oppressive social conditions especially the ones engendered in language itself. It therefore refrains and discourages the questioning of oppressive conditions of pressing concern. However, this accusation against Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is found wanting. This research shows that Crippen and Critical Theory inadequately assess the character of Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy. This work argues that, on the contrary, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy facilitates the endeavor of critique. It offers a paradigmatic reminder of how to do critique viz. doing a critique that is sensitive to language.

Keywords: Wittgenstein; Therapeutic Philosophy; Critical Theory

Introduction

In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks, “Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.” Because of this pronouncement, among others, Wittgenstein is interpreted to espouse a philosophy that is therapeutic. This therapeutic character aims at the resolution of philosophical problems brought about by linguistic entanglements. This task is exactly, for Wittgenstein, the role of philosophy.


3 To some degree, interpreters of Wittgenstein say that there is a sort of therapeutic end in his philosophy. There is, for instance, Peter Hacker, Gordon Baker, and James Peterman who explicitly state this. But what they mean when they say “therapeutic” is the locus of interpretative dispute. Cf. P.M.S Hacker, “Wittgenstein (London: Phoenix
What is integral in disentangling this linguistic knot is Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games. Briefly, Wittgenstein explains that there are many kinds of language; that is, there are many ways in which words are used. Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games shows that use determines meaning; and that meaning is intertwined with the activity of life, of everyday living. This specific reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy - the therapeutic dissolution of philosophical problems via the language-games - however, is also subject to various critiques. One such criticism is raised by Matthew Crippen. Having supposed that philosophy should aim at complete clarity, Crippen points out that the task is merely to clarify established language. In this sense, according to Crippen, the “therapeutic philosopher” whom he refers to as the Wittgensteinian philosopher takes language itself for granted. This work evinces that the description of the uses of words and the tabulation of linguistic facts jolts out a disposition of open-mindedness. Rather than limiting discourse, grammatical clarification paves open the possibility of creative expression in language. The description of the uses of words opens up a myriad of alternative grammars - rules for the language-games - and in this way dispels rigid adherence to any single grammar. Briefly, it is therefore far from what Crippen raises as “the unwillingness to interfere with and move outside established forms of language.”

**Theoretical Background**

First, we will need a brief course on Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy. Now what exactly do Wittgenstein scholars mean by it? Guy Kahane comments that Wittgenstein’s works left “a series of competing and often wildly contradictory Wittgensteins.” That is, numerous details concerning Wittgenstein are subject to various interpretations as such disputes about the exact vision of Wittgenstein are commonplace in Wittgenstein scholarship. For the purpose of differentiating the relevant interpretations from the rest, this research has to first lay down piece meals of the “many portraits” of Wittgenstein, i.e. the corpus of literature on the later Wittgenstein. Understanding the positions concerning the philosophy of Wittgenstein as a kind of therapy in the sections to come is essential in order to locate the points of contention for Crippen later on.

Pertinent here in discussing philosophy as a kind of therapy in Wittgenstein are those who read “two Wittgensteins,” - the “early” Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the “later” Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The focus is on the latter viz. the readings for the later Wittgenstein because it is in the later Wittgenstein that the notion of the language-games is introduced and where Crippen’s critique is directed. More definitely, the focus is on the interpretations concerning the later Wittgenstein’s occupation with therapy. It should be added further that this work takes the *Philosophical Investigations* as an exemplar of the later Wittgenstein. It is taken as a representative work but not to the exclusion of the other works of Wittgenstein.

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Classifying Wittgenstein Interpretations

First and foremost, there are several categorizations for the interpretations of the later Wittgenstein. Hans-Johann Glock, for example, distinguishes the “Rationalist” and “Irrationalists” camps of interpretation in the later Wittgenstein. Glock sees that Wittgenstein can either be interpreted as a proponent of justification and reason (rationalist) or as a sage and prophet (irrationalist) by virtue of his philosophy. For the irrationalist thematic, Glock enumerates the following interpretations: Existentialist, Therapeutic, Aspect, Nonsense, Pyrrhonian, and Genre interpretations. Relevant here are the therapeutic interpretations. Glock holds that “grammatical remarks of Wittgenstein’s later work are not conceptual clarifications but only therapeutic attempts to make us abandon philosophical problems for the sake of intellectual tranquility.” Simply put, he means to say that therapy in Wittgenstein is meant to cure disturbances in the mind which are philosophical in nature.

On another note, Phil Hutchinson considers three classifications for the later Wittgenstein. These are the Doctrinal, Elucidatory, and Therapeutic interpretations. Again, pertinent here are the Therapeutic interpretations. For Hutchinson, therapeutic readings see Wittgenstein as facilitating an “aspect shift for interlocutors.” What Hutchinson means, briefly, is that Wittgenstein’s philosophy allows one to gain a special insight that there are other ways to see or understand things. This constitutes the character of therapy in Wittgenstein according to Hutchinson.

Meanwhile, Guy Kahane and Edward Kanterian forwards another categorization to interpretations of Wittgenstein. It consists of the following: the Orthodox Interpretations viz. Peter Hacker; the New Wittgensteinian interpretations, viz. James Conant; and the Therapeutic interpretations, viz. John Wisdom. Generally, the Orthodox interpretations attribute the later Wittgenstein with a therapeutic purpose of removing philosophical confusions. The therapeutic readings, according to Kahane and Kanterian, see the Philosophical Investigations as aiming to release us from philosophical problems as well but this however is seen as a primary ethical interest. Proponents include John Wisdom, Friedrich Waismann, James Edwards, Gordon Baker and Stanley Cavell. It is important to note that there are different versions of the therapeutic approach in reading Wittgenstein respective to each proponent.

Let’s follow Guy Kahane and Edward Kanterian’s classification schema of Wittgenstein interpretation as guide. It is this classification that applies more broadly yet comprehensively to the matter at hand. In it, it is possible to define therapy (in Wittgenstein) as the dissolution of philosophical problems in general irrespective of the interpretative school. The endeavor here, chiefly, is specifically to explicate the readings of Wittgenstein as engaging in a therapeutic project. These kinds of readings are plenty. For instance, James Edward’s Ethics without

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5 Hans-Johann Glock, “Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey,” in Kahane et al. eds., Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, 52-60
7 Hans-Johann Glock, “Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey,”
9 Kahane et al., Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, 4-10.
10 Kahane et al., Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, 6-7.
Philosophy and James Peterman’s *Philosophy as Therapy* suggest that Wittgenstein throughout his early and later writings maintained a therapeutic aim. Since this work is concerned with Wittgenstein and more specifically his therapeutic philosophy, a distinction of terms is necessary.

**Philosophical Therapy or Therapeutic Philosophy**

According to Eugen Fischer, philosophy as a kind of therapy can mean two things. First, as “philosophical therapy,” philosophy is used to solve emotional and behavioral problems. Second, as “therapeutic philosophy,” philosophy has the goal of solving emotional and behavioral problems resulting from philosophical reflection. Now Wittgenstein, according to Fischer, belongs to the former (therapeutic philosophy) while Sextus Empiricus is an example belonging to the latter (philosophical therapy).

It is crucial to note that Wittgenstein lacked a systematic account of his own project as therapeutic. This very fact allows the possibility of multiple interpretations. At best his remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations* or, indeed, in any other text of his only hint towards a deliberate goal for therapy. To clarify this, we have to examine scholars who, in some detail, attempted at identifying the character of the later Wittgenstein to be therapeutic keeping in mind the distinction of terms given previously.

**Wittgenstein’s Therapeutic Project**

The issue of interpretation at stake here is how exactly Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is considered to be therapeutic. A representative dispute regarding the therapeutic method of Wittgenstein can be taken with Gordon Baker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein and that of Peter Hacker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. These two interpreters shall be representatives of the attempts to characterize therapy in Wittgenstein. Interestingly, Baker’s interpretation in *Wittgenstein’s Method* (which is his later reading of Wittgenstein) comes at odds with that of Hacker’s and where an interpretative dilemma surfaces. The distinction between philosophical therapy and therapeutic philosophy is important here. Baker avers the former for reading

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12 Eugen Fischer, “How to Practise Philosophy as Therapy: Philosophical Therapy and Therapeutic Philosophy,” 57-60.


14 In the *Philosophical Investigations*, the word “therapy” is mentioned in §133. There is mention of “treatment” in §§254-5, and “disease” in §593. All in all, there is no explicit pronouncement of a “therapeutic project.” However, it is notable that Wittgenstein would make several analogies of his “method” to that of psychoanalysis in his manuscripts. (Hacker, “Gordon Baker’s Later Interpretation of Wittgenstein,” in Kahane et al. eds., *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters*, 98.)

15 Briefly, Katherine Morris identifies an “Early Baker” who sees Wittgenstein as proposing a new theory of meaning, a “Middle Baker” who sees Wittgenstein as mustering descriptions of grammar, and a “Later Baker” who views Wittgenstein as being associated to psychoanalysis. (Katherine J. Morris, “Wittgenstein’s Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices,” in Kahane et al. eds., *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters*, 67-68.)
Wittgenstein but Hacker’s reading opts for the latter. A succinct discussion on both interpretations is to follow.

Baker reads Wittgenstein’s therapy as similar to psychoanalysis. This is to the extent that philosophy in Wittgenstein, according to him, is tasked with providing therapy from the torments of the unconscious. Hacker, on the other hand, sees Baker’s interpretation as “deeply mistaken” since for him it is not sufficiently supported by the texts. Nonetheless he assures that Wittgenstein is undoubtedly therapeutic but in a different sense from Baker’s reading. The reading of Hacker involves the elimination of misconceived ideas that hinder a clear view of the interconnections of concepts. Thus, therapy in Wittgenstein, according to Hacker, is such that it remedies confusions that manifests in the surface of our grammar by means of getting a clear overview of it.

Baker argues that therapy is primarily concerned with bringing consciousness to motivations and desires. In Baker’s understanding, philosophical utterances are latent unconscious manifestations of cravings, drives, and prejudices. Hence, Baker says, the target of Wittgenstein’s therapy is ultimately the acknowledgement of what unconsciously influences an individual which is reflected in language. Baker claims that his assertions allow Wittgenstein’s therapy to enhance the welfare of a person by making conscious of the unconscious so as to render the grip of the unconscious harmless. In this interpretation, the aim of philosophy is therapy from the torment of unconscious dogmas in one’s thinking.

P.M.S. Hacker holds a different position from Baker. For him, Wittgenstein is therapeutic in the sense that he ushered careful description of grammar between forms of expressions. This is in order to locate an interconnection of concepts that serves as the locus of philosophical confusions. Here Hacker says that having a pictorial view of our grammar illuminates discourse and thus avoids entanglement. Descriptions of the way words are used, precisely the perspicuous representations (übersichtliche Darstellung), sheds light upon philosophical confusions. In a similar vein, Dale Jacquette argues that language and its misunderstandings are not found in the “suffering psyche” but in language itself. If language, says Jacquette, is cured of “meaningless philosophical terminology that is not part of any genuine language-game,” there will be no more basis for having philosophical problems in the first place. This is in league with Hacker’s thought.

Hacker’s interpretation on the nature of Wittgenstein’s dissolution of philosophical problems is significant in the orthodox interpretation. His position magnifies the element of language clarification as descriptions of grammar but hardly advances more positive claims about

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the aims of philosophy, whilst Baker seems to implicate psychological claims such as making the unconscious surface to thought. Baker’s therapy purports to deal with biases that analysis cannot adequately dispel. But Hacker’s therapy deals with things where only a new kind of analysis of perspicuous representation can deal with.

From these brief explications on Wittgenstein’s therapeutic project, it goes to show that there is issue precisely with the meaning of therapy in Wittgenstein. More adequately put, that there is issue in characterizing therapy in Wittgenstein. The purpose of these discussions is to properly situate Hacker’s understanding of the nature of therapy in Wittgenstein (which will be important later) as it stands to others, and that there should be due recognition of other interpretations. However, the task here is not to give detail on the entire range of later Wittgenstein therapies. It is now proper to start extrapolating on the criticisms against therapeutic philosophy specifically in Crippen.

Crippen’s Critique of Wittgenstein

Matthew Crippen offers a unique critique against Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy. Crippen criticizes the later Wittgenstein in respect to its susceptibility to being insufficiently critical towards language in the sense that it inhibits criticism of language. In this section, we focus on Crippen’s position which argues against the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy under the pretense that such a philosophy contributes to “totalitarian currents.” In doing so, this section elaborates on the notions concerning the issues with Wittgenstein’s philosophy pressed by Crippen. In particular, this section opens the series of indictments by Crippen against the later Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy. Crippen forwards his case that there is no “wholesale rejection” of Wittgenstein’s thought, to be sure, but rather only a critical commentary or critical analysis of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought.

Crippen points out that Wittgenstein’s project investigates the functions and structures of language. It is in this sense that it is grammatically oriented. According to Crippen, grammar in Wittgenstein means the possibilities of use for a word referring to the many ways in which words are quite simply put. Typical in sentence construction, words establish what is meant. Words are used in various combinations with other words to form various meanings relative to the combination. Insofar as this is the case, grammar is the manner in which things combine.

Fundamentally, however, words do not simply yield meaning from the mere combination of words or their word-order. Crippen adds that words form meaning in relation to particular contexts. There are several factors that altogether shape the meaning and the potentialities of use.

27 Matthew Crippen, “The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy: Reading Wittgenstein through Critical Theory,” 1
Crippen enumerates things like environmental setting, gesture, and intonation which affect the relationships of communication between language-users. Depending on the context, the same word can serve multiple purposes. Crippen accordingly gives the example of “water.” A toddler pointing at a lake exclaiming “Water!” is one thing and a man stumbling in a desert who exclaims “Water!” is another. The former takes the form of a declarative (the toddler ostensibly points at water) and the latter an imperative (the man begs for water.) This simplistically denotes the difference of their uses albeit being the exact same word.

On the other hand, different words can be put into the same use. Crippen gives this example. “Can” and “understand” may refer to the same token of use in the statements “Can you [speak] Spanish?” and “Understand Spanish?” In this case, both words indicate ability in language or speech and therefore share “conceptual kinship.” In either case, viz. the difference of words for the same context or the same context with different words, meaning is evidently malleable with respect to its use. Thus, meaning is dependent on use such that a change in the usage of a word in a context entails a shift in meaning completely. These rather simplistic examples nevertheless convey the point. Again, to understand a word is to see how it is being used.

All things considered, Crippen agrees with Wittgenstein’s assertion that “The meaning of a word is in its use in language.” Understanding the meaning of “the use of words” is the linchpin of the thought. Crippen continues saying that on this view, questions of philosophy are questions of meaning. For example, “the roar of the processing engine is deafening” makes grammatical sense even before the truth of the matter, that is, prior to having an empirical measurement of the sound (in decibels, for instance). While the nonsensical is the confused misapplications of grammar such as, for example, “The sound of the sun tastes terrible.” Again, this is dependent on a large part on how the use of words is exercised.

A philosophical problem is like a grammatical joke. It involves a strange play of words. Crippen states that what is confused in philosophical discourse is the failure to arrive at the meaning of words. He gives an example of the word “nothing.” Now the philosopher who assumes the grammar of nothing along the lines of physical objects may perhaps struggle with the problems concerning the occupancy of space and the nature of a vacuum and so on. These sorts of problems, then, are grammatical fictions arising out of linguistic misinterpretation and therefore are false problems. The entirety of the issue, for instance, can be avoided by not assuming that particular sense of “nothing” and recognizing the sleight-of-hand of the grammar that could have been

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30 Matthew Crippen, “The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy: Reading Wittgenstein through Critical Theory,” 3
31 Ibid. Matthew Crippen, “The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy: Reading Wittgenstein through Critical Theory,” 3
32 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §43.
33 Crippen, “Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy,” 3.
otherwise. Take for example Gershwin’s *I Got Plenty of Nothing*. Crippen earmarks it for its different use of the word “nothing.”

There are many kinds of languages for there are many uses of words. Thus, there are many grammars (the uses of a word.) The role of the philosopher, according to Wittgenstein, is to look at language and to clarify its meaning -identifying the grammar and its applications- and subsequently the grammatical misinterpretations and misapplications. This is for the express purpose of alleviating conceptual confusions according to the therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein. Since there are many uses of words and relative to them are the varying grammars, i.e., what is permissible or not as per their use, then assuredly there are many methods in clarifying grammar.

Philosophy for Wittgenstein, Crippen writes, aims at perspicuity or clarity in offering elucidations that serve as reminders or points of observations for which a better command and overview of the use of words is possible. Wittgenstein, Crippen thinks, is against the use of words alien to the grammar of the discourse. For example, Wittgenstein is vehement against the metaphysical uses of the word “object.” More broadly, Crippen thinks Wittgenstein indicted the “unheard-of” use of words which in themselves result in confusion i.e., grammatical misinterpretation. Hence, Wittgenstein demands a clear view of grammar in order to remove our tendency to reach conceptual misunderstanding. There are many methods of doing this. For instance, one can give a negative definition of a word to clarify its meaning. “Evil” can be conceptually rendered as “not good” or the privation of it. Even Wittgenstein admits “[t]here is not one philosophical method, though there are indeed many methods, like different therapies.” In any case, the common element of whatever method is the clarification of language.

In considering the meaning of a word, one must always ask “Is the word actually used in this way in the language-game that is its original home?” The meaning of a word must be brought back to its everyday use, that is, to its proper language-game which is its home. Wittgenstein writes, “[B]ring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” But “everyday” here is quite misleading and there is a risk in mistaking what Wittgenstein might have meant. This does not necessarily mean that words must refer to their popular usage or that words must be tied to the vernacular or the vulgar layman terminology. Instead, it refers to the activity in which a word is being used. To understand the correct or appropriate use of a word is to have to look into the situation of the activity of its use. This will distinguish the proper from the improper use of a word,
where an improper use denotes the fact that a word is weaved away from the activity of its use to which it belongs. An example here is incumbent.

Let us use two “everyday uses” for a word like “function.” A mathematician gets to use terms such as “function” in the practice of their profession. A function in the activity of mathematics is an expression of a variable equation such as in algebraic expressions (e.g. \( f(x) = 2x + 22 \)). Asides from math, “function” serves other uses, e.g. as “assignment,” or “commission” among other things. Take for example politics and governance. The chief “function” of a bicameral legislature, political analysts say, is to have a chamber that checks hasty legislations (which is the case for a Republic). Now these are clearly two different activities of use. It would be inappropriate, then, to ask for the “function” of an algebraic equation along the lines of use in political science and vice versa. This would evidently lead to misunderstanding. Therein the demarcation between proper and improper use is elucidated, e.g. it is proper to use algebraic expressions in the context math and improper to use in a sense that is otherwise.

When Wittgenstein speaks of the “everyday use” of a word he is referring to whatever activities the word happens to be used in. The range of activities are, of course, innumerable. From a chemist in a lab; to an engineer in a drawing room; to soldiers in the field; to children playing, these may very well be activities of use that ground the context of meaning. A philosopher’s task, therefore, is not to interfere with these actual uses of words. That is, the philosopher should not disrupt, or in any way compromise, the activity of use subsequently the language-game.

Therapeutic Philosophy insulates the Language-games from external criticism

If Wittgenstein says language is like a game, and to be able to participate in the language-game is to employ words according to the rules of the game, then established languages have sensible rules. Crippen, however, exerts that this may not necessarily be a good thing. For example, boxing is a perfectly sensible sport with sensible rules but this does not mean that punching other people must always be an appreciable activity. Looking at an activity from the inside, that is, gauging an activity in its own lens will always result in such activity appearing sensible or reasonable. In this case, by activity we mean the particular employment or use of a word. To remain “insiders” as it were by taking the order of things in their own terms makes even the most outrageous seem sensible. There is then “an absolution of particular inanities.” That is, there is remission or an acquittal of activities that are plainly absurd or silly. What this means is that what might have been an inappreciable activity is simply looked past or maintained as perfectly appropriate. Consequently, a language-game becomes incontestable by virtue of being always treated as logically sensible.

Crippen states that it is by moving outside the activity of use that the absurdity of certain grammars is revealed. It is by looking at the language-game in alien terms that the “sensible”

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45 Ibid.
47 Crippen, “Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy,” 7.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
gram of that language-game is shown to be in fact irrational or false.\textsuperscript{51} Although Wittgenstein ostensibly declares that language is “in good order as it is.”\textsuperscript{52} The exact opposite seems to be the case for Crippen. For Crippen, language can harbor oppressive conditions.

Moving outside established usages of words via re-ordering grammar, according to Crippen, results in a twisting of language insofar as a nonsensical or arcane discourse is generated. In this sense, philosophers are difficult inasmuch as they willfully articulate alien grammars, i.e. non-common or non-established uses of language.\textsuperscript{53} There is an allusion to poetry which deliberately expresses its meaning metaphorically and allegorically. Crippen suggests that therapeutic philosophy does the opposite of poetry, i.e. it refuses to use words differently. Critical Theorists see this as a problem. Therapeutic philosophy seemingly inhibits new possibilities of meaning and also discourages non-conformity to established meanings. Crippen writes, “Critical Theorists insist the following: to counter Wittgenstein by uttering the unutterable.”\textsuperscript{54} What is ultimately suggested is that the expostulation in unheard-of ways within philosophy is akin to poetry. Philosophy, for Crippen, must be like poetry and Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy is not like poetry. The critical philosopher must bring to life what is inexpressible in established discourse.\textsuperscript{55} The point Crippen surmise is that the later Wittgenstein runs contrary to this. Wittgenstein fails to bring about unheard-of ways of using words. And for Critical Theorists this is a requisite to be able to do social critique.

If the therapeutic task of philosophy were at all to be therapeutic then it needs to be political. That is, clarifying language is not enough to truly emancipate the oppressed individuals because one would have only been illuminating the oppressive conditions reflected in language. This does nothing at all towards having emancipation from them and for Crippen there is a need for emancipation.

Philosophy for Critical Theorists should aim to change the world. To fulfill this role philosophy has to push the boundaries of thought and to develop conceptualizations that allow for new “alien” glimpses of things.\textsuperscript{56} Now therapeutic philosophy supposedly fails to push the boundaries of thought. It dismisses alien ways of using words. To dismiss unorthodox forms of meaning, therefore, would display linguistic analytic philosophy as hiding the conditions of social reality (an “ideology”). Crippen writes that a philosophy that maintains current conditions is one that denies its own ends.\textsuperscript{57} Crippen essentially argues that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy insulates language-games from external criticism. This is a clear indicator that therapeutic philosophy cannot do social criticism and therefore a philosophy that is uncritical.

\textit{Therapeutic Philosophy ignores the History of the use of the word}

The next insight Crippen puts forward is that linking use and meaning is a narrow and limited viewpoint because it is negligent of historical context. The typical understanding of a

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, §98.
\textsuperscript{53} Crippen, “Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy,” 8.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 10.
word’s use and the context of its use are too stringently focused on immediate settings that it discounts previous or past contexts. Crippen expresses the idea that meaning can be adequately understood by looking at its everyday use or viewed only in the context of current discourse. An idea he gathers from Max Horkheimer. There is much more to be had to meaning other than its surface use. For meaning may be receded behind the past or what once was.

Meaning is acquired in the fullest only in the course of historical process which cannot be penetrated by “linguistic short-cuts.” Each language, he continues, embodies the thoughts and belief patterns rooted in the evolution of the people who speak it; language embodies and carries the changes in time. The effects of being ignorant of history may very well be to jeopardize meaning. Ignoring may not only change meaning but also lead to its false constructions. The consequences may be more obviously spelled out as the propagation of oppressive and severe forms of language.

Wittgenstein acknowledges that sets of criteria fit some forms of language-games. Certain classes of the uses of words calls for its respective rules, or theoretically its operative procedures, otherwise not applicable to another class. Again, there are many language-games. And in their plurality we may draw at least equally the same number of grammars for which sense is determined. But Crippen marks that the general formula nonetheless remains: meaning is use. It is implied that a word is with its everyday use without exempt. This is withstanding the fact that Wittgenstein by vaguely saying “For a large class of cases…though not for all” may perhaps admit, though tellingly, of some exceptions. The pronouncement that meaning is the employment of a word largely fails to satisfy Crippen for sure. It allegedly misses to include the sort of historical criteria essential for interpreting concepts and ideas.

Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy in neglecting to attend to the history of a word’s use foreseeably engenders a problem because the history of the use a word is important for determining the present use of the word. The lack of a historical aspect in the maxim that meaning is use presents breeds a perspective which fails to see how a particular language-game came to be.

Therapeutic Philosophy discourages un-established Language-games

58 Ibid., 11.
59 Ibid., 13. Horkheimer writes, “It would be a mistake to assume that we can discover the essential meaning of a word by simply asking the people who use it.” (Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (London: Continuum, 2004), 112).
60 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, 111. By linguistic short-cuts, perhaps Horkheimer means formalism, logical analysis, or even conceptual elucidation.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 14.
64 Ibid.
65 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §43
66 Ibid.
Crippen opens the criticism that the Wittgensteinian philosophers’ have a limited viewpoint that is narrow.67 That is, Wittgenstein’s analysis is locked inside the activity of the language-game and, therefore, limits the universes of discourse to some insulated sphere of human activity.68

Therapeutic philosophy determines meaning on the basis that a word is used in such-and-such way. This also tacitly gives sufficient grounds to dismiss another use by virtue of being inappropriate for that use. Just because a language-game is not likely to articulate a certain use of a word, it is not a reason to invalidate that use of a word and in effect exclude it from the language-game altogether. But in the operational mindset, this is merely standard operating procedure. The operational mindset refers to the activity of describing meaning solely on its use.

Crippen brings to bear the intrinsic ideological character of linguistic analysis. Again, if a word is not taken in the use which is its home grammatical illusion is sure to follow. Recall that certain uses of words belong to certain contexts and to take this use of a word outside of its context generates nonsensical meaning. This assumption of therapeutic philosophy is precisely the locus of the problem. Use is always isolated in the particular case entailing that the specific use or activity rebukes what it deems “non-use” i.e., alien. The language-game easily raises in objection the alien and subsequently dismisses it. Therefore, therapeutic philosophy latently discourages discourse.

Crippen, moreover, moves to argue that this affords the status quo a sweeping advantage.69 To wit, the established universe of discourse deters anything that is otherwise not belonging to it. That language must have strict ordinance of exactitude, perspicuity, and clarity is to sieve off what is contrary to this. Subsequently, the disturbances of the alien grammars are trashed as nonsense in their non-conformity.

What is observed of Linguistic analytic philosophy, Crippen writes, is the indignation of conservatives.70 This comes out quite strong. But we are led to believe, following the course of this section, that this is warranted. Several of Wittgenstein’s pronouncements are measured by Crippen as severe and authoritarian. If he were referring to the Tractatus it might not come as surprising. But alas he means the later Wittgenstein of the Investigations.

What have been exhibited so far by therapeutic philosophy are only solutions to “that which is only academically controversial.” Therefore, the sophistication of therapeutic philosophy in no way poses a threat to the established order or to influence significantly social reality.

*Therapeutic Philosophy operationalizes Meaning into a matter of function*

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67 Crippen refers to Marcuse who says that Analytic philosophers’ “a]alysis is ‘locked’; the range of judgment is confined within a context of facts which excludes judging the context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which their meaning, function, and development are determined. (Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2007), 119.)


69 He invokes Marcus who writes, “For precisely the setting aside of a special reservation in which thought and language is permitted to be legitimately inexact, vague, and even contradictory is the effective way of protecting the normal universe of discourse from being seriously disturbed by unfitting ideas.” (Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, 189.)

70 Ibid., 25.
Crippen also finds that there is a positivistic or operational token in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy. Generally speaking, to operationalize concepts is to clarify abstract and vague concepts by translating them into concrete and overtly measurable phenomena.⁷¹ This is characteristic of scientific endeavors in general which had its prototype in experimentation and laboratory techniques. His point of contention is that this instrumentalization or positivistic operational criteria is a trend towards one-dimensionality.⁷²

This form of operationalization, i.e. the reduction to procedure, use, or function, affects the sphere of life. Indeed, “meaning is supplanted by function...language has been reduced to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production.”⁷³ There are similarities here to be found in Wittgenstein for which Crippen advances three points. First, both operationalization and therapeutic philosophy aim at clarifying the meaning of words. Second, both emphasize the concrete over the abstract. Third, both take focus on function, use, or the “how” of practice. At this juncture, Crippen interjects Marcuse to ground his claims.

Crippen argues that therapeutic philosophy fixes on one meaning as a matter of procedure or operation. This is precisely a problem because it cements a one-dimensional thinking, i.e. a thinking that sees things in one way only. Appropriated in Crippen’s critique, one-dimensionality is mechanically seeing only one possible use for a word.

Critical Theorists value forms of language that move outside the established order of discourse.⁷⁴ Recall that language-games are judged internally, that is, from inside the activity and according to its own rules. This notion is closely associated to therapeutic philosophy. According to Crippen, there is truthfully some merit to this. By positioning language-games separately, the language-game is protected from subjugation by a more dominant one.⁷⁵

To have a language-game gauged by another is akin to having express subordination to a more authoritative language-game. Now there are examples of a language-game domineering over another. Crippen cites the discourse of Science as an example. The scientific discourse enjoys a lofty status contrary to its alternative unscientific discourses.⁷⁶ For example, architecture has taken lengths to exclude geomancy. The former is to be upheld and the latter scoffed in the business of infrastructure planning.

Medicine and philosophy; science and spiritualism, and so on are separate insomuch as their respective language-games are significantly different. This does not mean, however, they cannot overlap.⁷⁷ The aforementioned merit is nevertheless counterbalanced by its negative consequence. The problem, Crippen sees, is that this differentiation (of a language-game to another) forestalls criticisms and entrenches the status quo of its use.⁷⁸

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⁷¹ Ibid., 17.
⁷² Ibid.
⁷⁵ Ibid.
⁷⁶ Ibid., 21-22.
⁷⁷ Ibid.
⁷⁸ Ibid., 22.
Further purported results are striking. Setting up different language-games is implicatively recognizing tolerance of all these language-games. This exudes the attitude of being uncritical of any language-game, that is, a refusal to negatively read language-games. The very same shelter that protects a language-game from external interference also shelters it from criticism.79

Critical Theory and Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy are alike in the surface of their principal endeavors, viz. there is much clarification to be done by philosophy in language. But there are controversial areas visible in the perspective of Critical Theory not visible in Linguistic Philosophy and vice-versa. Crippen’s paper shows that it is premature to disengage what is seemingly disparate. The point ultimately with Crippen is that therapeutic philosophy is latently an uncritical philosophy. This means to say therapeutic philosophy is inadequate in its pursuit or that its pursuit is itself inadequate. In either case, therapeutic philosophy is muddled thinking. Crippen’s position which we take as Critical Theory’s position as well is wholly contestable. To do this, we first lay bare their portrait of Wittgenstein. Having perspicuity of their views on Wittgenstein allows thereafter demonstrations of their errors. In other words, to show why Critical Theory is mistaken is to show what Wittgenstein correctly meant. To this, P.M.S. Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein shall be very important.

The Nature of Philosophy: Hacker’s Reading

Ordinary language is in good order and its goodness lies open to view.80 “Good order” let us recall assumes an important import for Crippen. At any rate, according to Hacker, Wittgenstein’s established new task is to command the description of the widely ramifying network of concepts associated with linguistic meaning.81 What we have learned about perspicuous representation (the clear mappings of language-games) is indispensable here. Attaining perspicuity of our language has for its corollary the elimination of misunderstanding and subsequently philosophical perplexity.82

Therapeutic Philosophy is essentially the surveying of language

Achieving clear survey of language is the new task of philosophy. Philosophy is to describe the overlapping rules of language. Philosophy, therefore, consists of the descriptions of the use of words *inter alia* describing the language-games.83 Philosophy is not like science by virtue of its occupation. This is because philosophy is an overview of the very many forms of thought.84 In this respect, it may not interfere with the use of language. Philosophy is simply the mappings of our language.

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79 Ibid.
Philosophy does not accrue anything apart from what already is present. That is, there is no progress in the sense like in the sciences. There is no accumulation or generation of new knowledge because philosophy is only a clarification, a sharpening, a refining of linguistic observation and measurement. The work of the philosopher consequentially is assembling reminders of how words are used. The quest for surveyable representation of the grammar of language is coupled on the other hand with a character of curing diseases of the understanding. This refers to the notion of therapy.

**Therapeutic Philosophy aims to dissolve Philosophical problems**

Philosophy is an activity whose primary occupation is the disappearance of philosophical problems. Philosophical problems are superficial problems. That is, they are not really “problems.” Instead, philosophical problems are just entanglements in language. Philosophical problems “arise primarily out of misleading features of our language.” What is gathered, then, is that philosophical problems must not in the first place cause emotional distress or any real sense of human suffering for that matter. This is achieved when we understand philosophical problems are plainly just linguistic puzzlements. This therapeutic result is rendered possible by the token of perspicuous representation. To repeat, perspicuous representation enables the illumination of grammatical forms (rules) we confront that are obfuscated.

Philosophical problems are “dissolved” insomuch as they are rendered immaterial. This is insofar as the Orthodox reading is concerned. It is good to interject here the friendly reminder that the interpretations of the “therapeutic” character of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are plenty. It is worthwhile to restate this next assertion. “Philosophy is therapeutic insofar as it restores the bewildered to an optimal intellectual state of good sense akin to good health.” Hacker’s proposition encompasses elegantly the importation for therapy necessary for this work.

**Therapeutic Philosophy disavows over-commitment to habits of thought**

One main source of philosophical confusion is what Hacker calls a “picture.” A picture is a perverse satisfaction of a philosophical idea. That is, an overt fixation to a philosophical idea. Some examples include the belief in an eternal Self e.g. Vedanta, a perfect unchanging reality e.g. Platonism, and absolute certitude e.g. Cartesianism. To be sure, these are not problems in themselves but they become problems when these suppositional beliefs are forced into engagement without others ideas which are incompatible or contrary to it. For example, Frege thought it was such a scandal that mathematics had not secured a conception of what a number is. His philosophical problem was rooted in his picture that there should be undeviating certitude concerning number for mathematics. Evidently, mathematics would still continue as it did independent of the success of Frege. Another great impediment, which Hacker identifies, is the

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85 Ibid., 32.
86 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §127
89 Hacker, “Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein,” in *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters* eds. Guy Kahane et al., 100.
expectation of a new deep revelation or the craving for the arcane.\textsuperscript{91} In any case, surfacing these philosophical pictures into recognition and acknowledgment is part of restoring an optimal state of intellectual good sense. Perspicuous representation allows the identification and therefore the removal of our own pictures.

\textit{Therapeutic Philosophy summarily obtained}

The previous explications may give an implication that philosophy is trivialized by Wittgenstein. This is plainly false and misleading. Let us recapitulate Hacker’s tropes on the nature of philosophy found in the later Wittgenstein.\textsuperscript{92}

(i) The descriptive methodology is accompanied by extensive argumentation that painstakingly demonstrates the errors found in our language.

(ii) The descriptions of the use of words are the primary course of method, and its fruit is a new manner of clarity, and an articulate understanding of conceptual connections.

(iii) Diseases of the intellect are shown through perspicuous representation. Attaining perspicuous representation are indeed descriptions and arrangements of the rules of our language.

(iv) Philosophical problems are rooted in the forms of language and the most deeply embedded habits of thought.

(v) Connective analysis or elucidation offered by the descriptions of perspicuous representation answers philosophical questions and suffices the craving philosophers typically crave for.

(vi) Philosophy has no theories like in science but only explanations. And explanations invite elucidation and clarification towards the bounds of sense. But there are innumerable ways of explanation.

The enumeration above should dispel the idea that philosophy is trivialized by Wittgenstein. We have sketched Wittgenstein twice now, i.e. one according to Crippen and another according Hacker. Remembering the initial task of this work, it shall be argued that Crippen, in light of Hacker, Wittgensteinian philosophy must be therapeutic contrary to Crippen.

\textbf{Two Wittgensteins: Crippen’s and Hacker’s}

We are drawn to two Wittgensteins viz. the one Crippen sketches and the one Hacker sketches. We shall find however the case that they are really just one. That is, they have a common understanding of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy.

The reason for which we may say that Crippen’s Wittgenstein runs parallel to Hacker’s Wittgenstein are as follows. First, both posit the later Wittgenstein as aiming to dissolve philosophical problems by clarifying the structure of grammar. And this is basically the elucidation

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{92} Hacker, \textit{Wittgenstein’s Place In Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy}, 112-114.
of how words are used in such-and-such ways which allows for the disentanglement in language. Secondly, both see the later Wittgenstein as proposing the need for a tabulation of linguistic facts. Wittgenstein required a perspicuous survey of the usages of words in order to act on the first point of clarifying grammar. The tabulation of linguistic facts requires a comparative survey of the usages of words that may produce unclarity, hence a logical geography of concepts or perspicuous representation. Finally, both find the later Wittgenstein strictly bounded in the study of words. The only explanations found in philosophy are descriptions of the various uses of words which are done for the purpose of resolving confusions resulting from the misuse of words Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, must be the description and clarification of our language. Subsequently, philosophy is tasked in alleviating conceptual confusions that arise for unclear language. Philosophy may have no other purpose. The foregoing discussions illuminate these pointers. We know for a fact that Crippen maintains them and that Hacker does as well. This roughly constitutes a general Hacker’s therapeutic Wittgenstein and Crippen promptly assumes all these three key points as the position of Wittgenstein too.

These three key points show the undergirding similarity of Crippen and Hacker’s Wittgenstein. Put in a slightly more explicit manner these points indicated above are what Crippen’s reading assumes as facts to Wittgenstein and hence it is where he platforms his subsequent critique. It is necessary to recall the two previous chapters to accommodate this understanding.

A Response to Crippen

We begin the prosecution of Crippen and Critical Theory. Our first argument focuses on the issue pertaining to the “is-ought” problem. Deriving an “is” from an “ought” is one such usage of the term naturalistic fallacy. This use is purported first by Hume. This work, however, intends on employing a derivative formulation of the fallacy. To begin, Crippen clearly attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is.” That is, Crippen as a matter of fact wishes for Wittgenstein to provide a prescription of action from perspicuous representation. In short, he demands the necessity of a normative project in Wittgenstein. To be sure, perspicuous representation is already a prescription insomuch as Wittgenstein insisted on its importance as an activity. But it does not carry the weight of a moral or duteous rule. The issue one can foresee with Crippen is that it is not justifiable to impose ethical notions (which in this case is the amelioration of human life from ideological oppression) unto perspicuous representation.

Crippen attempts to argue that the failure to import ethical considerations in perspicuous representation may perpetuate oppressive language-games. This is unfounded. It would be akin to saying that delineating accurately the territory of oppressive countries is also maintaining and perpetuating their oppressive rule. Mapping language-games that may or may not be oppressive is never the same as actually enacting those oppressive language-games.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations are grammatical. Now insofar as they are grammatical they are not intended to be reified into reality. What this means is that Wittgenstein operated at the conceptual level and not immediately in social levels. In Wittgenstein, grammatical statements or linguistic facts i.e. rules function as objects of comparison rather than a thesis. What this crudely means is that linguistic rules are models or instruments of employment thus allowing the possibility of a plurality of instantiated uses. Suppose we map out one hypothetically distasteful
language-game, this by no means whatsoever entails an acceptance of that language-game for us to employ. On the contrary, it serves as a negative object of comparison from which one may gauge a more suitable language-game i.e., a good example of what language-game not to play. Thus, we attain an unbiased description of even the most ridiculous language-game yet not for any instance suppose that any such language-game are remotely appropriable. The clear view of that language-game is meant to project rules of language free of prejudices. Hence, in the enterprise of perspicuous representation, the very activity of therapeutic philosophy, we are bracketed from canonical or authoritative linguistic norms. Again, the investigations are conceptual thus they are investigations towards rules and not the applications of those rules.\textsuperscript{93} This does not mean we are without reign over the applications rather we are disposed to compare freely the applications from there.

The passage “Philosophy must leave everything as it is”\textsuperscript{94} is cited as definitive evidence of Wittgenstein’s conservatism. The kernel of Critical Theory’s grievances, and if Crippen is understood correctly here, is that ultimately the description of grammatical facts leaves alone the social and political problems. More strongly put, that Wittgenstein’s thought is without effect to the pressing issues. This grossly simplifies their points but it is not a hasty generalization of them either. On the contrary, Wittgensteinian philosophy is the prolegomenon to tackling the urgent axiological problems.\textsuperscript{95} Philosophy, in the hands of Wittgenstein, shifted towards the activity of improving one’s thinking process in the most profound manner viz. being sensitive to language and all the queries that issue from it. Philosophy, in Wittgenstein, more concretely practices what social theorists often preach—the relegation of theory in favor of practice. Indeed there is no theory at all in the later Wittgenstein. Now Crippen, again, argues that Wittgenstein’s perspicuous representation, therapeutic as it may seem, does not draw into question the established universe of discourse. The answer to this allegation is the fact that it does. Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, does not attenuate any universe of discourse in themselves and also philosophy does not prescind the possibility of discussion towards discourses or at any rate the language-games. Besides, how confident is Critical Theory in supposing that its own narrative is more attentive to “reality” than others? In any case, descriptive philosophy i.e., perspicuous representation of the workings of language sufficiently prepares an individual for a more refined social critique. So Wittgenstein’s philosophy does not inhibit social criticism.

The foregoing discussions show the case that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy is resilient from Crippen’s critique. Crippen’s criticisms of Wittgenstein do not adequately stand with respect to these principal points:

(i) Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis and the attainment of an unclouded survey of language and the subsequent alleviation of linguistic entanglements do not and cannot expunge non-conformity to established language-games. On the contrary, it avows rigid adherence to any such established language-game.

(ii) Wittgenstein’s project of perspicuous representation is instrumental to tackling the socio-politico-ethical issues. It is only a matter of utilizing the clear mappings of our

\textsuperscript{93} Hacker, \textit{Insight and Illusion}, 196.
\textsuperscript{94} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, §124.
\textsuperscript{95} Hacker, \textit{Insight and Illusion}, 196.
language that we may more smoothly, adequately, and even properly take in axiological considerations.

(iii) Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy contains no value judgments not because it does not recognize them but because it is not necessarily the requisite of the investigation. It is a naturalistic fallacy to suppose linguistic descriptions must criticize oppressive conditions when in fact it is not pertinent at all.

(iv) Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation does not rule out the possibility of critiquing dominant ideology. Instead it facilitates the discussion. The investigations provide the dossier of grammatical facts that may very well serve as the means of realizing and identifying the conditions of life requiring reform or emancipation.

(v) Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity is a paradigmatic reminder of how to carry out critique. It confronts the very way in which we look at things i.e. in language. Thus it teaches reflective sensitivity to how language works.

It would be worthwhile at this point to reiterate the main points of Crippen’s argumentation. His argument may roughly summarize into the following four main points:

a. Therapeutic philosophy insulates the language-games from external criticism.
b. Therapeutic philosophy discourages un-established language-games.
c. Therapeutic philosophy ignores the history of the use of the word.
d. Therapeutic philosophy operationalizes meaning into a matter of function.

Each of these shall be counteracted in light of the characterizations of perspicuous representation handed previously in what follows.

With regards to the first point, therapeutic philosophy does not insulate language-games from external criticism because perspicuous representation presents the language-games as objects of comparison between other language-games. Therefore, a language-game can be evaluated through comparison with other language-games. Therapeutic philosophy opens language-games to criticism effectively by comparing it with other language-games.

Concerning the second point, therapeutic does not discourage un-established language-games because perspicuous representation opens a clear view of other language-games established or otherwise. Perspicuous representation also showcases the possibilities of grammar hence the encouraging possibly new forms of grammar. Perspicuous representation reveals other language-games and therefore facilitates the appreciation and use of un-established language-games.

Concerning the third point, therapeutic philosophy does not ignore the history of the use of the word because the history of the use of the word is an important variable in the task to attain a command a clear view of language i.e., perspicuous representation. Mapping the language-games also entails mapping what were once language-games and what may be the next language-games. Previously and currently existing grammars are included in the tabulation of language-games.

Concerning the last point, therapeutic philosophy does not operationalize meaning because perspicuous presentation does not prefigure grammar. It does not dictate meaning rather perspicuous representation only pictures it. Therapeutic philosophy does not close off the possibilities of meaning and reduce meaning into one type of function (one-dimensionality). This is because perspicuous representation liberates from fixed grammar by displaying the possibilities
of grammar, that is, the many kinds of grammar and because perspicuous representation does not impose nor regulate grammar as if it were an authority.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This work ensconces a refutation against Crippen’s critique of Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy. In Crippen’s analysis, therapeutic philosophy is an uncritical philosophy for principally four reasons. First, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy’s ideation of the language-games are insulated from criticism, that is, it is treated as immune from external strictures or disapproval. Second, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy discourages un-established or alien forms of discourse (language-games) tying in from the first point above. Third, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy’s occupation of mapping out the meaning of words ignores the history of the use of the words. That is, therapeutic philosophy is not sensitive to how words were previously used only how words are currently used. Fourth, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy views the meaning of words on instrumentalist lines. Therapeutic philosophy, in accepting that meaning is use, harrowingly suppose that all meaning is a matter of purposefulness thereby operationalizing the meaning of words and therefore forwarding a reductionism of meaning to procedure and function. These four reasons elicit the tendency of therapeutic philosophy to be silent or negligent of the oppressive conditions of social reality according to Crippen. Therapeutic philosophy subsequently perpetuates oppressive conditions by failing to critique the language-games that harbor oppression. This work maneuvers Crippen’s critique into contact with the P.M.S. Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein using the Hacker’s reading as a platform.

Crippen’s accusals are countered with respect to the following reasons. First, therapeutic philosophy eases the possibility of avowing rigid adherence to any established language-game by showing other language-games. Second, therapeutic philosophy may utilize the clear mappings of language to more adequately take in axiological considerations. Third, it is fallacious to suppose that linguistic descriptions must immediately proceed to criticize oppressive conditions when in fact it is not pertinent at all. Fourth, therapeutic philosophy facilitates the discussions on the endeavor of critique instead of stifling it by virtue of the possessing the dossier of linguistic facts. Finally, therapeutic philosophy teaches a paradigm in doing critique viz. a critique sensitive to language and of the manner critique itself is being linguistically articulated.

The work argues crucially that Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is not unwilling to criticize pressing concerns like oppressive social conditions. The case is that Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is vouched to be contrary to that. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is in fact paradigmatically critical.
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