

Friedrich Nietzsche's Nihilism and Will to Power and a Levinasian Response to the Foundation of the Morality of Man

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Abstract: Friedrich Nietzsche is widely known for his statement that boldly says: "God is dead", but as much as it is widely known, it is also widely misinterpreted. In his book entitled *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (The Gay Science), Nietzsche explained that the God that the Christians believe is no longer a firm foundation of morality for it is obvious that the Christians themselves no longer recognize and uphold the morals that emanates and transcends from the said God, though Nietzsche claimed that man himself killed God (not in the literal sense), he also mentioned that the majority of people are still in denial and still refused to recognize this so called "death of God" and he further argued that they were unconsciously being hypocrites for denying it. But eventually, when the people do accept this "death" and when the idea of God is no longer believed, what will then be the foundation of man's morality? Nietzsche then turned to nihilism and sought for something that is according to him, even deeper and more basic than the late foundation of Christians' values, he called this new foundation; 'will to power' which Nietzsche claimed as the foremost motivation of every human being. This paper will further discuss Nietzsche's concept of Nihilism and 'will to power' and I will argue that this so called 'will to power' alone might not be sufficient to be the foundation of man's morality, although man naturally drives and lives for his own sake (as Nietzsche argued), our being moral is not independent to other human beings, we cannot be moral if the main driving force for our actions is of selfish motives. Moreover, the paper will also introduce Emmanuel Levinas' ethics and his concept of 'Totality' and 'Infinity'; I will then argue that Levinasian ethics could be use as the foundation of the morality of man instead of Nietzsche's so called 'will to power'.

Keywords: Levinasian Ethics, Morality, Nihilism, Will to Power

Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche was a German philosopher, poet, classical philologist, and one of the most prominent existentialists who shook the very foundation of

morality and religion. He is perhaps most remembered by the common people in his eccentric claim that states "God is dead"¹, which in fact shows only the tip of the iceberg

of his philosophy. He first challenged the beliefs and religion of the people of his time and decided to eliminate the concept of God altogether; he then resorted to nihilism and established the so called “will to power²”, which according to him, can be the basis of one’s drive to live and a new foundation of the morality of man. Nietzsche’s philosophy challenges everyone to be active and not be passive in life; he is more of a fan of taking things in his own hands than just letting things be, his philosophy is centered not on knowledge *per se*, but in man’s existence.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born in Röcken, Prussia on October 15, 1844, he shared the same birthday with the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV whom he was named after.³ His father died when he was only five years old leaving him to a handful of female relatives, particularly his mother, sisters, and aunts. He attended universities of Bonn and Leipzig and at the age of twenty-four, he taught Philology at the University of Basel. Nietzsche was a sickly person who suffered migraine headaches and poor eyesight, his mental health also diminished later in life. He discovered the work of Arthur Schopenhauer in 1865 and was greatly influenced by it. He resigned at the age of thirty-five because of his failing health, but this did not stop him from writing. He published a book almost every year and was able to write ten books in nine years, but almost ten years after his resignation, he had a mental breakdown and was never able to recover completely. The exact cause of Nietzsche’s insanity is still unclear, but some claims that he was afflicted with a syphilitic infection, while others argue that he inherited a mental illness from his late father. He died of pneumonia and stroke at the age of fifty-six.

Nietzsche wrote many books, but these were not widely read during his time, nevertheless, he

never doubted that his books would soon be a force to be reckoned with in the field of philosophy. Though he became almost laughable when he lost his sanity, in the end, all his efforts paid up as he is now one of the most widely known philosophers and his thought is still considered as an essential topic for discussion.

In this paper, the author will discuss Friedrich Nietzsche’s rather shocking claim about the death of God and the Nihilism that inevitably followed after it. The author will argue that Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ might not be a good foundation of morality especially if it focuses solely on oneself and disregards the welfare of others. This paper will also introduce Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics and use it as a possible alternative to Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ and despite Nietzsche’s claim that God is dead, such ethics could still be functional as the author will argue that the God that Nietzsche proclaimed to be dead is not the same God that Levinas believed in.

Nihilism and the Death of God of Friedrich Nietzsche

Though it can be said that Nietzsche’s cry about the death of God is what he is most remembered of, the very notion itself is widely misinterpreted. Nietzsche is not just someone who claimed that God is dead just because he liked to, most people who hear about his cry are immediately shocked and offended by his claim, some might just contradict it without even giving it a second thought, such claim is not just something that catches people’s attentions, it must also provoke them to think and reflect.

Nietzsche’s anthropocentric philosophy urges one to live without the comforts of religion and other illusionary traditions that make one incapable of establishing his own existence.

According to him, people only made the concept of God for they cannot stand on their own, their weakness caused them to construct an illusion that they can rely on. Nietzsche also stated that in the age where science and technology dominates the world, the idea of God is no longer relevant and claiming that “God is dead” is merely stating the obvious.⁴ Nietzsche’s aim is not to sadden people by his seemingly outrageous claim; rather he wanted people to realize that they are free and not slaves to moral commandments, they are not someone who are constantly being watched by a supernatural being above the clouds. For Nietzsche’s believing in the afterlife is pure escapism from the sufferings that one is experiencing in the present. According to him, people need to stop romanticizing their sufferings in the world they are living in now in the hopes that they will get a reward later in the afterlife because the truth is, there is no after life, people need to live in the world and accept that this is the only world, what matters is the present and not imaginary, uncertain future.

Nietzsche eliminated the concept of God not for his own amusement, in fact; he wanted to liberate the people of the imaginary bonds that limits them to live fully. The death of God, as Nietzsche argued, would mean that there is no longer a source of moral standards and now people will have to create new values for themselves, values that they themselves create and not just something impose on them by other people or institution. The death of God then must not cause despair to the people but rather exhilaration because they have found a new drive to live that is neither dependent to a super natural being nor to an imaginary paradise. By proclaiming that “God is dead”, Nietzsche burned the very foundation of man’s illusions, and from the ashes rose a new burning drive to live, Nietzsche believed that in this way,

people will have to believe in themselves because their strength comes from within and not elsewhere.

A. God as the absolute standard of values

By eliminating the idea of God, Nietzsche also eliminated the absolute standard of truth and values; he destroyed the very foundation of the morality of man and without the idea of God, to whom will the people depend on? Can we be good without God or is the very idea of ‘good’ now being redefined?

In Nietzsche’s philosophy, he presupposed that God is indeed the absolute standard of values and so he thought that by proclaiming him dead, not only would the illusions be gone but most importantly, people will necessarily have to create new values for clearly their previous standard whom they based their morality on has already been proven to be only an illusion. But this is where he went wrong, people might have worshipped God, served him and many times rely on him but this does not necessarily mean that they strive to be a moral person for him, because of him, in obedience to him or in fear of him; people must strive to do good not because it is what God wants but because doing good is good in itself and so if God is no longer on the picture, the foundation of their morality will not crumble and fall precisely because their morality is independent from religion. However, this does not mean that religion is independent from morality; it is true that a nonreligious person could be moral but a religious person could not be immoral, otherwise they are not being religious at all.

Nietzsche also claimed that the very concept of ‘good’ has changed over time, from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary thinkers, the concept of ‘good’ has been redefined on countless occasions however, Nietzsche argued

that there is no such thing as an absolute view point, there is no one correct interpretation, the shifting meaning of 'good' itself is an evidence of the struggle of different wills. In his book entitled *On the Genealogy of Morals*, he stated that the nobles (consists of the persons who have power, take for example; warriors and lords⁵) impose their own moral guidelines as the 'right' thing, and anything that does not comply with their guidelines is necessarily bad. Thus, their morals are formed *by themselves for themselves*, without considering the interests and good of other people. The ignoble (consists of the people who are somewhat opposite to the noble, namely the weak and the poor) on the other hand, resists the moral guidelines that are forced upon them, if for the nobles, being rich is good, then relatively, being poor is bad, but the ignoble cannot accept this, they did not try to become rich so that they too will become 'good', instead, they turned the table around and claimed that being rich is 'bad' and being poor is 'good', and whatever it is that the nobles have, it necessarily becomes 'evil' for them, namely power and money. This is what Nietzsche meant when he implied that there is no one fixed viewpoint when it comes to truth and reality, one bends reality to obey his will and not the other way around. According to him, people force reality to submit to their will and this is precisely what he called 'will to power', an idea that is somehow borrowed from Arthur Schopenhauer whom he admired in his early years.

Friedrich Nietzsche's "Will to Power"

After the death of God come nihilism and an opportunity to create a new set of values, Nietzsche, after destroying the temple of an illusionary religion could not simply leave and not finish what he started, he was quick to propose a new drive for a man to live. If Kant

before him claimed that we can never know God and not even if he really exists or not, and then somehow comforted his readers saying that despite not being able to be sure of God's existence, one can still believe in him, Nietzsche on the other hand, outright proclaimed that God is dead and after this, knowing that the people would fall into despair, he quickly said that it must be seen as an opportunity for the strong to stand on their own. Nietzsche called this new found urge to live as the 'will to power', according to him, it is what motivates one to live, an "urge to freedom", and it is the 'will to power' that struggles to be independent from all the other wills. But the 'will to power' is not merely about dominating others, it is more importantly about dominating oneself, being able to discipline and to have control over one's own self, a strive to be stronger, deeper and more independent. A man who has this so called 'will to power' has control over his life and surroundings, he does not to submit to another's will and he is continuously being the master of his own life, someone who is the master of all and a slave to none, not even his own desires and feelings. For Nietzsche, 'will to power' is enough to have morality, one need not to invent an invisible being who has all the good qualities in order to have a standard basis of all values, according to him, morality itself is an indication of the 'will to power' and the 'will to power' is all what man needs in order to live his life fully.

Problem of Friedrich Nietzsche's Will to Power

It might be true that the 'will to power' is fundamental to one's life (it is the main force to live after all), it might also be true that it is exactly what mankind needs in order to move forward and escape his haunting past that is full of illusions and make-believe stories but it

might not be true that it is what leads man to become moral, in fact it, might cause the opposite.

In Nietzsche's philosophy, one will either be a master or a slave, there is no in between, and of course one cannot be a master without having slaves and one cannot be called a slave without a master and apparently, Nietzsche did not believe in the whole golden rule that was thought by Confucius himself, it was clear that in the beginning that one of Nietzsche's aims when he established the concept of 'will to power' is for people to be independent and not be slaves that move in obedience to a nonexistent supernatural being but it turns out that the 'will to power' is not for everybody, he did not aim for the weak to be strong but for the strong to be stronger. In Nietzsche's philosophy, only the strongest will live fully and the weak (if they continue to be weak) will be left for themselves. For Nietzsche, to become moral is to discipline oneself but at the same time to become independent from another's will, and one would only be able to do this if he use his 'will to power' in order to dominate another before they dominate him, in Nietzsche's world, it is either dominate or be dominated and for him the key to being moral is to be able to establish one's own set of values, that way, he is the master of his own self because his values are created by him and for him and not something impose on him. But this kind of basis of morality is neither ideal nor practical because this might lead to an overlapping 'will to power' of different individuals and a basis of morality that is not universal and is merely subjective would later leave chaos in its wake. It is also not possible for all people to become masters, most will inevitably become slaves, especially the weak, the passive and the powerless, Nietzsche's new found foundation of morality is unstable and

unpredictable, a continuous struggle of wills is not what mankind need, they did not break free from the prison of illusion only to fight against each other or to dominate over the other, Nietzsche is basically saying that one should not submit to another's will but one can and should dominate over the other because it is only a manifestation of his 'will to power' and it is actually the right thing to do. Nietzsche venerated the strong and despised the weak, his 'will to power' is simply stating that life itself is chaotic and in a world in constant flux, only the strong will survive.

Levinasian Response to the Foundation of the Morality of Man

In order to fully understand Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy, one must first delve into his life and get to know him as a person whose sufferings and hardships helped form and develop his ethical thought and whose education is influenced not by one but many cultures.

Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher (he became a French citizen in 1930) of Jewish ancestry born in Kaunas, Lithuania on January 12, 1906. Growing up, he studied the Talmud, read the Hebrew Bible, was influenced by the Russian writers and their inquiry about the meaning of life (especially Tolstoy, Pushkin, Gogol, Lermontov and Dostoyevsky) and by the writers of Western Europe particularly Shakespeare, he also became acquainted with the philosophy of Heidegger and Husserl later in life. He studied both in France and Germany and was later enlisted into the French army and taken as a prisoner of war. Being of Jewish ancestry, he was well aware of the persecutions of the Jews, not to mention, his Lithuanian family was killed by the Nazis. The tragedies in Levinas' life wounded not only his flesh but also penetrated his soul. It is perhaps normal to have a spiritual crisis after such events but what is

important is that he struggled to overcome it, he asked himself questions about violence and where can God possibly be amidst all their sufferings. The lessons that he learned from different cultures (Jewish, French, Russian, German) combined with his experiences, reflections and inquiries about his life formed the foundation of his philosophy which primarily focuses on ethics.

With all that being said, it is now clear where Levinas is coming from and why his philosophy centered on ethics and even regarded it as the first philosophy. Apparently, his philosophy is entirely different from that of Nietzsche, but the aim of this paper is not to find similarities between the two but rather to propose Levinasian ethics as a possible solution to Nietzsche's nihilism. The succeeding parts of this paper will discuss the key terms in Levinasian ethics particularly his concept of Totality and Infinity and his understanding of morality.

A. Emmanuel Levinas' Concept of Totality

In his book entitled *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas discussed thoroughly the main points in his philosophy. By 'Totality', Levinas meant the reducing of "the Other" to "the Same"⁶, a way of thinking in which I is at the center, where the I dominates the Other and where the Other is only used as a tool of the I. Totality is self-centeredness, it is a thinking in which the I does not treat the Other as an equal but rather as something he can use for power, the Other is not merely reduced to something, but it is only considered as a *thing*, the Other is objectified by the I and is denied of its individuality. Levinas also speaks about human totalization as a tyranny, in which one uses and manipulates the Other and robs them of their freedom. Of course no one wants to be a slave, everyone

desires to be free and to continue to be free, that's why Levinas said that the tyrant must soon acknowledge that he cannot possibly conquer everyone, he cannot and should not ignore the freedom of others because one will fight as hard as he can in order to protect his freedom. This concept is not far from Nietzsche's master-slave morality, but in Nietzsche's philosophy, it is encouraged to be a master (even if it means crushing someone else's will to power), while in Levinas, he argues that the I should respond to the Other's plea (a move that Nietzsche considers as a sign of weakness). Furthermore, Levinas argues that amidst all the violence towards the Other, ethics is the first philosophy, in which he means that before the violence, the I first realizes that he has an ethical responsibility to the Other but he just chose to deny it. This is shown by his refusal to look at the Other's Face whenever he commits violence against him, he aims for the back and strikes when the Other is not looking, the I does this because he has already experienced the Other and knows that the Other demands but at the same time pleads to be acknowledge, an acknowledgement that the I purposely ignored. Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia once stated in one of his lectures that "an experience of recognition must precede the denial of the Other—which denial is the foundation of violence"⁷ which only proves that ethics indeed precedes violence and not the other way around.

Nietzsche's concept of will to power is somehow relevant to Levinas' concept of Totality, although his will to power is not necessarily focused on dominating the Other but on having control of oneself and bending reality according to one's will, the will to power's consequences somehow lead to an inevitable totalization and manipulation of the Other and using them as a means to acquiring

power. It is also important to point out that Nietzsche did not really discuss about the 'other' in his philosophy, he did not stress on the other's importance, much less their well-being, what he cared about are the brave and the strong ones who are willing to take up his challenge, and as implied earlier Nietzsche could not care less about the other, unlike Levinas who made the Other the center of his philosophy. In addition to that, will to power is similar to totality in such a way that they both struggle to be on top or at the center, a person's desire to not be dominated drives him to dominate over the other instead, and this is where the conflict arises, not only will such a scenario become chaotic, it will also cause a war of individuals who all have a desire to not be dominated and who perceive that the only way to do it is to dominate the other first before they even get the chance to make a move against them. Levinas knew that this kind of totalization exists and so did Nietzsche, the former rejected it while the latter hold on to it as if it's the only thing that is keeping him and everyone else alive.

B. Emmanuel Levinas' Concept of Infinity

If by 'totality' Levinas means domination, totalization and manipulation of the Other, by 'infinity'⁸ on the other hand, he means infinite responsibility to the other and the Other as someone who cannot be confined and constrained to one's knowledge, it is the Other's face that shows a glimpse of the infinite and it is the Other's face that is the basis of morality. Levinas discussed that the I commits itself to the Other in the same moment that it sees the Other's face that pleads for him to respond and that commitment is not something made out of mere impulse or whim, it is a lifetime devotion to be responsible to the other, an infinite responsibility that seeks nothing in return. This

kind of responsibility for the Other is not only a demand by the Other, but also a mere plea and this plea is precisely what made the responsibility ethical. But what is exactly in the face that made the I commit itself to it? Why would the I instead of continuing to dominate over the Other, decide to be responsible to it instead? According to Levinas, the vulnerability of the face and its call that says 'thou shall not kill' is what prevents the I to commit violence against it, in fact he said that 'access to the face is straightaway ethical'⁹ which means to say that by truly seeing the face and by realizing its vulnerability and susceptibility to violence is enough to make the I responsible for the Other, say for example, one need not need to think about what would Levinas say if one happens to come across a beggar on the street, the beggar's pleading face (literally and in the Levinasian sense) alone should make one feel the urge to help, thus an ethical act for Levinas is not made out of a decision but by intuition.

This is so-called 'infinity' of Levinas might be a strong basis of morality and a solution to Nietzsche's nihilism for it neither grounds itself on doing good deeds for merits nor do moral acts for the sake of the 'God' above whom Nietzsche denied. Levinas' ethics stresses on doing good because it is good in itself and not because someone dictated the people to do it (the latter being a notion which Nietzsche despised). However, Nietzsche was not really fond of giving others the power, he wanted the individual to have the power themselves, if Nietzsche was alive in the time of Levinas, he would never allow the others to have such great power over the I. Nietzsche would surely be threatened by the idea of the "Other" who pleads and at the same time 'commands' the I to be responsible, he would be troubled on how the I could possibly give up his power for such petty affairs. But in reality, the Other do not really

have much power over the I, they can cry out “thou shall not kill” but they surely cannot prevent the I from killing them, the I still have all the freedom to respond to the call or not, they are not slaves for the Other as soon as they accept the responsibility, rather, by taking the responsibility they free themselves as they go out of their own selves and reach out for the Other, and by this reaching out, they grow and become moral (at least in the Levinasian sense).

C. Comparison of Nietzsche and Levinas' Concept of God and Morality

‘God’ for Nietzsche, as said earlier, is the standard source of all values, people, particularly the weak, clings and relies on him whenever they experience sufferings and hardships, it is he whom people run to whenever they have problems that they can’t solve, whenever they are feeling lonely and alone, or whenever they wish to have something that they cannot have. Of course Nietzsche meant it when he said that God is the source of all values, but it is important to note that those kinds of values are the values that Nietzsche despised. That is why he claimed that ‘God is dead’; he wanted a reevaluation of values because the people in his time (and maybe even in the present generation) blindly accepted those so-called ‘values’ without even giving it a second look, he wanted people to be brave and strong enough to rely on their own strength, those people who rely on an invisible to God to govern their lives are what Nietzsche called ‘weak’, they are also the ones who acts as victims whenever the strong takes advantage of them, when in the first place, they were the ones who are not brave enough to take up the challenge. Nietzsche also said that deep inside the weak people’s thoughts, they also want the power that they very much despised, this is proved by their hope to gain a reward when they go to the afterlife, that maybe by

then, they will look down on hell and see the strong ones that manipulated them when they were still alive being swallowed by flames of hell, their teeth gritting and their flesh being licked by the tongues of fire. That being said, it can be interpreted that for Nietzsche, to be moral is to be strong and to be ‘good’ is to exercise one’s freedom and to develop one’s abilities, whatever it is that contributes to self-growth is good, and whatever restricts one’s development is bad, thus being active, powerful, strong, courageous, prideful and noble is good and being passive, powerless, weak, cowardly, shy and ignoble is bad.

Levinas on the other hand, did not claim that God is dead nor did he argue that He should be the reason why people should strive to be moral. Levinas mentioned God in his writings several times but only to stress that God is in the Other, we catch a glimpse of him whenever we see the Other’s Face. But Him being *in* the Other does not mean that He is being *confined in* the Other, for God transcends the Other but it is only through the Other where we will be able to look at God. The Other then is a way to the Infinite, an Infinite which neither dictates what the I should do nor imposes on him values that he should follow. In a way, Levinas agrees with Nietzsche when he said “to be worthy of the messianic era one must admit that ethics has a meaning, even without the promises of the Messiah.”¹⁰ Both Levinas and Nietzsche did not want people to do good deeds for the promise of heaven, both of them did not want Authoritarianism¹¹ where people just do good because it is what God should want, because he has the most power and authority, and according to Bernard Williams if people only do good because they do not want to burn in hell, that is not being moral, that is being egoistic¹². For Levinas then, to be moral is to be truly responsible for the Other, not just in theory but

in action, it is not enough for the I to speak of being good to Others, he must practice what he preach, as Levinas himself stated it “to come to the aid of a neighbor in need with empty hands is hypocritical. It is material goods with which I have to help the Other.”¹³ That being said, it is evident that in Levinasian ethics, one need not insert God in the picture in order to do moral acts because the Other alone commands and pleases the I to be responsible and if ever the I responds the call, he is doing it because it is good in itself and not because of the promise of heaven.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed Nietzsche’s claim about the death of God and his nihilism that started as a consequence of it, I also discussed his notion of will to power and its possible aftermath. I have argued that the will to power will bring more distraction than advancement to the human race and that it is only beneficial to the strong ones and the weak will be left for themselves as they bow to those who are in power. Nietzsche aimed to liberate the people from their blind obedience to the values that were imposed on them but his solution was to propose a new set of values that might be far worse than the former values that he aimed to destroy. I have argued that the will to power will not be good for humanity in the long run because of the overlapping will to powers of individuals that arose from the desire of each individual to protect their freedom and expand their power. For Nietzsche, man lives for his own sake and such will to power is already natural to him, it is an urge to live and what drives him to survive, but I have argued that although it is important for man to look out for himself, he must not neglect the welfare of others. Through Levinas, I have also argued that one cannot possibly ignore the Other,

sooner or later, the I will soon acknowledge the presence of the Other and confront his pleading face. Contrary to what Nietzsche believed, man cannot be moral if the main driving force for him to live is of selfish motives, thus the will to power could not be the new foundation of the morality of man, Levinasian ethics is more appropriate because not only could it stand on its own without the idea of heaven and rewards in the afterlife, it also focuses on the Other and its well-being and not just the I and his selfish instincts.

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, ed. by Adrian del Caro and Robert Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), 3.

³ Hollingdale, R.J., *Nietzsche The Man and His Philosophy* (revised edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968)

⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Moral*, trans. by Ian Johnson (Virginia: Richer Resources Publication, 2009), 15.

⁶ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 35.

⁷ Leovino Ma. Garcia, *Infinite Responsibility for the Other: The Ethical Basis of Humane Society According to Emmanuel Levinas*, p. 158.

⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority*, 23.

⁹ Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, trans. by Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 88.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

¹¹ Donald Palmer, *Why It’s Hard to be Good*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 45.

¹² Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 201.

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