

The Three Fundamental Emotions according to Spinoza and their Possibility of being overpowered by another

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Abstract: Benedict Spinoza's major work entitled, "*Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order and divided into five parts*" comprises of his contentions regarding Ethics by using an unusual approach which is the geometrical method. He started on his discussion and examination on the nature of God, from which his well-known concepts of substances and the like were derived. However, this study will focus essentially on the middle and third part which is the Origin and Nature of Emotions, particularly his arguments on the three fundamental emotions. The overarching goal of this study is to find out whether there is a possibility of having another emotion that could overpower these three fundamental emotions. Thus, there arises two problems that this study aims to answer: (1) Is it possible for another emotion to overpower the three fundamental emotions? And, (2) If yes, what could it be? The researcher will attempt to answer the two problems by first exploring the whole work of Spinoza, in order to understand his geometrical method. Hereafter, the researcher will provide a brief overview on emotions as proposed by various philosophers, mostly contemporary ones. From here on, the researcher will proceed to Spinoza's discussion on emotions which will progress in the discussion of his primary emotions, which is the *conatus*. It is from this *conatus*, that the research will mainly derive her contentions on the possibility of another emotion.

Keywords: Another, conatus, emotions, ethics, geometrical method

In a world full of knowledge and wisdom, I find it quite disheartening that most, if not all, of those that are being pursued¹ by the philosophers are only those which have been already discussed several times that it already became one of the most talked about topics by philosophers. Perhaps, it is because of the reason that philosophy is divided as to its different aspects—Metaphysics, Epistemology, Theodicy, Aesthetics, Logic, Rational Psychology, and Ethics—each of which, focusing on specific questions and provides

various solutions or arguments. But, as of today, seeing the horrible events happening in our world, I believe that it is the branch of Ethics that is what we need to more fully examine. However, I would not dwell on morality, which is probably what most think when they hear of such word. After all, ethics is also sometimes considered as a moral philosophy, concerning the difference of good and evil, learning the values, right way of living for the individuals, and the like. Rather, I would like to focus on something, which is considered to be under

ethics; that is something overrated and overlooked at the same time. I believe it is overrated in the context of the mundane world insofar as emotions are always talked about. Yet, overlooked because there seems to be only a few persons who explored this topic, most especially in the field of philosophy.

Thus, I believe it is understandable for me to choose to explore and analyze Benedict Spinoza's discussion on emotions for two reasons: (1) because his discussion and contentions on emotions is not given its due significance. This can be seen from the commentators of Spinoza who mostly gave more emphasis on his other arguments viz. unity, attributions of substance, and the like; (2) because Spinoza provided a different approach on understanding emotions—that is by using the geometrical method which includes propositions, definitions, and axioms. Furthermore, the method used by Spinoza, is interesting for others believe that emotions are contrary to reason, in a sense that it cannot be fully explained by reason, nor it could be explained through logical or rational propositions such as Spinoza's.

The said discussion of the emotions of Spinoza is founded in his major work, *Ethics*², which is in fact really entitled as, "*Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order and divided into five parts*". The five parts are: (1) On God; (2) On the Nature and Origin of Mind; (3) On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions; (4) On Human Bondage; and (5) On the Power of Intellect or Human Liberty. Thus, it is on the third part of *Ethics* that I will concentrate on. I will be analyzing his discussion on the emotions, mainly his distinction of the primary or basic emotions, and will try to prove that there is a possibility that these three fundamental emotions may actually be overpowered by another—what could that be

and how could it overpower, will just be shown throughout the paper.

Ethics

Before proceeding to a specific part of his work, I believe it is best to first have an overview of what really contains *Ethics*. It is said that the title of his work, is actually derived from Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics.³ Further, it is said that he is trying to "evoke Euclid's *Elements*, the most successful axiomatized body of theory that the world had ever seen."⁴ There are actually various interpretations of *Ethics*, and not just Spinoza's specific points in the said work, but also the general content of it—why was it made and what it really points out. Some for instance believe that it is an implied criticism of his contemporary proponents.⁵ On the more specific side, *Ethics* was also "designed to treat man's nature and the moral life in terms which... were sufficiently definite to entail an account of the place of man in the natural world."⁶ But perhaps, what I actually prefer, and which I consider most acceptable, is that "*Ethics* seeks to demonstrate a broad range of metaphysical, theological, epistemological, and psychological doctrines."⁷ For the mentioned doctrines could easily be seen in the division of *Ethics*.

Emotions

The emotion is probably one of the most complex things in this world. If one would rank things from the most complex to the least, I believe that it is best to put the concept of emotions as one of the most complex things. It is simply because of the fact, that there is still no absolute certainty on this concept. For instance, we still do not have an absolute reason as to why we have various emotions, or what triggers such emotion, or as to when did we realize we have it.

Indeed, there are several theories regarding these questions, but because of the number of theories, and also because there are a lot of possible complications that rise up whenever there is a proposed “absolute” theory, nothing is actually resolved. Everything about emotions is still complicated and confusing to understand. If for instance, we try to define emotion itself, there will be way too many definitions that will come up. Say, I am just a normal person, who wanted to know a definite explanation of what emotion is. I then searched the word “emotion” in the dictionary and get these⁸: (a) a strong feeling; (b) the affective aspect of consciousness; (c) a conscious mental reaction subjectively experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body. Also, for most people, emotion is oftentimes interchanged with moods or feelings. Likewise, emotion, as proposed by some, may also be classified as either a state or a process.⁹ However, upon getting these definitions, one might just get more confused rather than enlightened. Especially when one finds out that there are primary and secondary emotions. So to avoid such confusion, let us first go back to some of the first philosophers who discussed emotions.

It is Plato who first assessed emotions philosophically through his argument on the Tripartite structure of the Soul namely, the Appetite, the Spirited, and the Rational. Though originally, this was tackled for his examination of a just man and a just society, these three parts still coincide with the emotions. On the other hand, his student, Aristotle, though it is not really the emotions that he tackled, but in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, he stated that all our actions are directed towards an end, and that end is happiness (*eudaimonia*). Both Plato and Aristotle, as what has been shown, did not

directly talk about emotions, rather ethics. Thus, on the latter part of this paper, I will discuss why it seems that it is inevitable for someone to discuss emotions without talking about ethics or morality. On the other hand, if we go back on the earlier times, it is the Stoics that actually provided their own definition of emotions. Not only that, they are also the first ones to categorize emotions as “basic”, and thus enumerating four basic emotions, namely: delight, distress, desire, and fear.¹⁰ However, research on the basic emotions began in the 1860’s with Charles Darwin.¹¹ Research studies also provide varying stands on the list of the basic emotions. Further, there are also studies focusing on the expressions of emotions—its nature, reasons, effects, and the like. But how does one really classify emotions as basic? Others claim that emotions are said to be basic if they are universally shared. And this universality is measured through the recognition of facial expressions. This argument, further, is still being explored for the distinct and specific facial expression that scientists claim is still changing. Also, according to Peter Goldie, in his article, the explanation on the expression of emotions can actually be divided into two. Through expressions of emotions as actions and not actions.¹² However, Spinoza’s approach in explaining the nature and origin of emotions differs from the aforementioned theories and arguments. Thus, we may now officially proceed to Spinoza.

Spinoza: Emotions

First of all, for Spinoza emotions are natural phenomena, contrary to the others’ claim that emotions are intentional phenomena that is, emotions for them, are always directed at something. For this reason, we can say that it is what made him have an aim which is indicted in the preface of the Part III of *Ethics*, wherein

Spinoza stated that no one during his time seemed to do to define the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind controlling over them.¹³ He further stated that he would use the same method he used during the first two parts of his work—the geometrical method. Thus his work is composed of definitions, postulates, and propositions. It is therefore proper to first analyze the definitions he had given.¹⁴

Definition 1:

“I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the said cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood through the said cause alone.”

Definition 2:

“I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding Def.), when from our nature there follows in us or externally to us something which can be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when something takes place in us or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause.”

Definition 3:

“By emotion (*affectus*) I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections.”

He then included a note just after definition 3:

“Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by emotion I understand activity, otherwise passivity.”

In addition to the definitions 1 and 2, for Spinoza, we are active insofar as we are the adequate cause of something which only happens when we have adequate ideas, while we are passive insofar as we are the inadequate idea cause which only happens when we have inadequate ideas.¹⁵

It is from these three given definitions that Spinoza will base and prove all his propositions. The three definitions follows one another insofar as, Spinoza first defined adequate and inadequate causes in Def. 1, for he then used it in differentiating activity and passivity in Def. 2; then in Def. 3 he stated that the power of activity is increased or diminished which will actually be used in his distinction, on the latter part of his work, between the three basic or fundamental emotions.

Three Fundamental Emotions

From the definition of action (activity) and passion (passivity), Spinoza distinguishes the three fundamental emotions, namely: joy, sadness, and desire. Further, we can derive this distinction from his Prop. XI: “Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.” (*Ethics III, Prop XI*). According to Spinoza, joy or pleasure is a transition to a greater perfection or greater power. On the other hand, sadness or pain is a transition to a lesser perfection or power.¹⁶ To further understand this, I will be following Jarrett’s discussion on the conatus doctrine and the three primary emotions, in his work, *Spinoza: A Guide for the Perplexed*.¹⁷

First of all, both joy and sadness are considered as passive transitions of the mind: from greater and lesser perfection, respectively. He further divides it in relation to the body and mind. For joy or pleasure, there are *titillatio* and *hilaritas*; while for sadness or pain, there are *dolor* and *melancholio*. Moreover, *titillatio* and *dolor* are said to affect only some parts of the body whereas, *hilaritas* and *melancholio* affect the whole, or all parts, equally. This distinction is significant for it shows that the affects, on either some parts or the whole of the body, greatly vary. For instance, the pain I feel when I my head is aching differs from the pain I feel when I find out a family member dies. Thus, for Spinoza, the difference of joy and sadness is more focused on the increase or decrease of one's activity and not really of power. As what Jarrett said, "Although Spinoza makes this identification, he does not suggest a way of quantifying the amount of power we have at a given time, nor does he consider how to measure increases or decreases in it."¹⁸

Now that I have discussed the first two fundamental emotions, which are joy or pleasure and sadness or pain. I will now try to discuss and analyze Spinoza's concept of desire.

Throughout the whole *Ethics*, it seems as if desire does not really have a definite meaning for, Spinoza, both used it in representing as an emotion or affection and the essence of a person. Also, this confusion may also be caused by the different translations of his work, and thus each translator attributed the word "desire" to different meanings. Nevertheless, I would just like take it as to how I understood it, and hopefully it would be sufficient, for it will be a significant factor in the aim of my paper.

Basically, desire (or *conatus*) is considered as the essence of a person because for Spinoza, we

have one most basic desire—that is to persevere in existence. From here comes the notion of desire as an emotion for, according to Spinoza all other desires arise from it. Further, the said striving or endeavor to persist in being is also called an *appetite* insofar as it is related to the mind and body together. Appetite is also defined by Spinoza in the earlier part of Part III, as the dictates of the mind and therefore varies according to the state of the body. Furthermore, Spinoza also stated that "between and appetite and desire there is no difference."¹⁹ However, this endeavor, when referred solely to the mind is called *will*. (*Ethics III, Prop. IX*)

Morality and Emotions

Aside from the fact that emotions are already complex, something that adds up to its complexity is its relation with morality. It seems as if one cannot actually remove the said connection. For with every emotion, especially when it is at its extreme, comes a question of morality, of good and bad, of right and wrong. Let's imagine a situation. Say, there is a couple fighting. Both of them are already beyond mad. And then the girl said something that made the boy more furious that he managed to throw the favorite book of the girl in the sink, making it wet and thus unreadable. A question now arises, is the action of the boy wrong? But he can say, that he was so blinded by his anger, he was not able to think clearly. Is his action forgivable? How do actions as regards to emotion measured? Where do we draw the line? How do we categorize actions from emotions as good and bad? These are just some of the questions concerning the connection of morality and emotions. Thus, in almost, if not all, books, articles, and/or any discussion on emotion, there is always a part allotted on the examination of their connection. This connection is also seen in Spinoza's *Ethics*. Though, there is a difference

between ethics and morality, as argued and proved by Deleuze in his work, *Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy*, one cannot deny that Spinoza still acknowledged this association. After all, emotions is a part of *Ethics*, and thus have a significant role in bringing and finding a true system of moral behavior insofar as it is the transition for Spinoza's identification of true freedom, values, and the like which are all in the Part IV of *Ethics*. The connection I am talking about is that of the difference of our judgment on something because of our desires. It seems that Spinoza is implying that there is no real object that is inherently good or bad. To further understand, I will quote him:

It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it. (*Ethics III, Prop. IX*)

In simpler words, we don't desire something because we judge it to be good; rather we judge it to be good because we desire it. This claim of Spinoza is actually problematic for it seems as if the judgment relies in each persons' desire, and thus, if everyone is the judge of, say morality, it may lead to or create a chaotic world.²⁰ In addition to this possible chaos, is the fact that for Spinoza, good and bad is that which agrees with our nature or does not agree with it.²¹ In other words, the problem lies on the human nature or essence of the individual for two reasons: (1) For Spinoza, human beings are mechanisms in nature insofar as they are motivated by their self-preservation²²; and (2) It is this self-preservation that constitutes their essence. To further understand this claim of Spinoza, and to see the underlying problem behind this, we will now proceed to the part of the paper focused on desire and/or *conatus*.

Desire or *Conatus*

It has been said in the earlier part of the paper that there seems to be confusion between the difference of desire and *conatus*, for the reason that, Spinoza, sometimes use these two words interchangeably. Further, it is because of the fact that he states that desire is both an emotion—in a more loose sense of the word; and the essence of a person, which is to persevere in existence. But in this part, I would focus on his second definition—that is the essence of a person to persevere in its own being, to persist in existence, to *be*. Because of such definition, I cannot help but see the similarity from Hobbes's view on human persons, that is, self-preservation is their motivation and they would do anything at all cost to do such. Thus, the question will now be, if Spinoza's claim is similar with Hobbes's does it mean that for him, human beings are capable of hurting someone if one deems it as good based on his judgment?²³ If our most fundamental desire, and indeed our essence is the endeavor to persist in existence, then does it follow that we will do anything *to be*? If so, is it possible to desire evil for others?²⁴ This is just one condition that shows how Spinoza's definition of desire is problematic, especially when we relate it to morality. Another problem is that he takes the knowledge of good and evil to be an emotion of joy or sadness.²⁵ If this is true, then in the example I have given earlier, that of the couples having a fight, the action done by the boy is possibly forgivable inasmuch as anger may be associated with sadness.²⁶ Further, it also means that there is no definite or absolute good and evil, it is only because and through the emotions that we value something as good or evil. This is problematic for, emotions, vary greatly from each persons—the extent of emotions, its effects, the expressions of emotions—are all different with every individual. Thus, it would seem that

morality and judgment of good and evil will merely be arbitrary. From these given ‘problems’ regarding his definition of desire (*conatus*), it would then seem that he is actually contradicting himself inasmuch as he is not staying true to his aim that is discussed in the latter part of his *Ethics*: (IV) On Human Bondage and (V) On the Power of Intellect. After all, the Part III of *Ethics* is the building blocks of his discussion on these two.

As stated earlier, Spinoza in some sense implies that there are no objects that are inherently good or bad. Rather, they are good or bad as they affect us; insofar as they promote or decrease our power and desire to persevere in being. So for instance I see an object and let us name it x , which is neither good nor bad. But when, for some reason, I suddenly desired it; I longed for it; I wanted it. I now see x as good. It thus increases or promotes my power to persevere in being. But what if, my desire for the said object (x) is actually just a distortion of what really is inside of me—something that, unconsciously pushes me to persevere, to desire x believing that it is good. But then, what is it? Is it the two other emotions (sadness or joy)? Or is it a different thing? Before I discuss what this is, I will first prove that Spinoza, though unaware of it, actually provided a chance for me to prove that there is a possibility for the said desire or endeavor to exist, and the two other basic emotions, to be overpowered by another.

Considering the possibility

Again, as what has already been shown and discussed, for Spinoza there are three fundamental emotions: joy or pleasure, sadness or pain, and desire. However, it is the desire or *conatus* that somehow weave all of his arguments, for it is our essence and our most fundamental desire to endeavor in existence. On the contrary,

I believe that there is something that might be considered as the most fundamental emotion or if not, at least there is something that might be able to “overpower” these three, as based on Spinoza’s own arguments. But first, how did I think of such possibility? It is actually from Spinoza’s own words that he opened a possibility. According to him, “Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.” (*Ethics III, Prop. XV*) So long as it affects us in either the increase or decrease of the power of activity. Thus it follows, that this cause may actually be an “overpowering cause” to say the least. Further he states that, “We endeavor to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce pain.” (*Ethics III, Prop. XXVIII*) Therefore, we would really do anything just to persevere in being on the condition that it will be a pleasure to us, and the reverse for pain. Thus, as I have said earlier, it may be that there is some unknown thing that drives us to give such great amount of effort in persevering. And this something is actually fear. How so?

Going back to Spinoza’s statement that we don’t desire something because it is good, rather we judge it to be good because we desire it. And the fact that we will do everything, since it is our nature and essence, to preserve in existence. We may say that our actual desire for goodness is just distorted by our fear of *not* persevering in existence. That what we think of as *conatus* is in fact, fear disguised as desire. Similar with what Spinoza thinks of our ignorance of what the body can do. I say that it is only because of our ignorance of what fear can do, that my statement may seem absurd.

Let’s say that life (or existence) is the greatest pleasure and thus the greatest good one can and

should strive for. On the other hand, the end of life (death)²⁷ is the opposite, meaning it is the pain. From Prop. XXVIII, it is obvious that a person will ensure that he will do anything to get this greatest pleasure, this greatest good and will avoid anything from its opposite which is the death of a person—a pain. Now let's say that knowledge (in general) is a kind of pleasure; however what kind of knowledge is it may be a factor as to distinguish it as pleasure/joy or pain/sadness. For instance, the knowledge of the existence of fear disguised as desire is not pleasurable insofar as, staying true to Spinoza; it does not increase one's power of activity to persist in existence. Instead, it triggers the emotion of sadness. This is where my argument on fear possibly overcoming the three fundamental emotions, may enter, for, as said by Plato "there are pleasures, which they are afraid of losing and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others."²⁸ Thus, for the pleasure of life which people are afraid of losing, and in their desire to keep them, people tend to abstain from pleasures, say knowledge, because they are overcome by others. Overcome by fear itself.

On top of this, Spinoza also said that, "Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater." (*Ethics III, Prop. XXXVII*) Thus, the greater the desire of a person, to persevere in existence, which actually arises from pleasure, the greater the fear, unconsciously drives them to do so. Further, there is what we call an illusion of final cause, as what Deleuze²⁹ said. This illusion makes us think that the effect of a body on another body or of a mind on another mind, is the final cause of its actions. Similarly, in Spinoza's claim that desire or *conatus* is what makes us endeavor to persevere in existence, I say is that it actually is just an illusion. It is an illusion because the effect of fear, which is to

make us to desire *to be* because we are afraid of *not being*, is seen by us as the final cause of our actions to, pursue joy or pleasure and avoid sadness or pain.

Conclusion

Before I end this paper, I would like first to reiterate some points in Spinoza's argument on the fundamental emotions, and my own arguments. Basically, there are three fundamental emotions for Spinoza. The first is joy or pleasure which increases our power of activity to persevere. The second is sadness or pain which is the opposite of the former. These two are considered as passions.³⁰ The last, and actually the fundamental one, is desire or *conatus*. This is our endeavor to persist in existence; to persevere. Throughout the *Ethics III*, Spinoza concentrated on this desire claiming, further, that every other desires (and emotions) actually arise from this. I, however, believe otherwise. As abovementioned, fear is actually what makes us to endeavor. Specifically, the effect of fear. Therefore, our *conatus* is, in reality, only a fear disguised as desire. If I am right then, the next two parts of Spinoza's *Ethics* will be questionable. Though I would like to further explain how could this happen and discuss other relevant things as regard with my claim, I am afraid that I have allotted my time only to discuss the mere possibility of another—that is fear—in overcoming the three fundamental emotions for Spinoza, and thus, to do such will be, I hope, for another time.

¹ By the word "pursue" I mean that it is being given great importance, perhaps even more than its real value.

² Note that from here on, I will use the italicized word *Ethics* to differentiate it as Spinoza's work from Ethics, in general, as another branch of philosophy.

³ Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza Unfolding Latent Process of his Reasoning*, Volume 1 (New York: Harvard University Press, 1969).

⁴ Jonathn Bennett, *Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume* (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2001), 112.

⁵ *Op cit.*

⁶ Roger Scruton, *A Short history of Modern Philosophy: from Descartes to Wittgenstein* (London: Routledge Publishing, 1995).

⁷ *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. by, Dan Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 268.

⁸ The following definitions are from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary.

⁹ For further differentiation on the two, see: Gregory Johnson, "Theories of Emotions", in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ISSN 2161-0002, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>, 12-06-15.

¹⁰ Knuuttila Simo, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

¹¹ Anthony Hatzimoyis, *Philosophy and The Emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹² For more information regarding this, see: Peter Goldie, "Explaining expressions of emotions", in *Mind* (Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-38.

¹³ Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. William Hale White and Amelia Hutchinson Stirling (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951).

¹⁴ The following definitions are founded on the Ethics itself. *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Inadequate ideas involve the mind's passivity—'undergoing'; adequate ideas involve its activity—'doing'. The more the mind has inadequate ideas, the more it is liable to passions; the more it has adequate ideas, the more it is active. See: Genevieve Lloyd *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza and the Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1996)

¹⁶ Charles Jarrett, *Spinoza A Guide for the Perplexed* (New York: Continuum International Publishing group, 2007).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁹ It is for this reason, that from hereafter, I will be using these words interchangeably.

²⁰ If this is true, one might think that Spinoza's claim, and the possible outcome of such, is similar with Hobbes's state of nature wherein everyone is at war against all.

²¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988).

²² *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. by, Dan Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

²³ In Hobbes's state of nature, since he assumes that they are like infants, without any kind of education or training, and thus acts, in order to secure his preservation, sometimes viciously. See: Bernard Gert, *Hobbes: Prince of Peace* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p.63. Hobbes also stated that conflict is inevitable then proceeded in enumerating the three causes of conflict: competition, diffidence, and glory.

²⁴ This is somewhat answerable in Spinoza's Prop. XXXIX in Ethics III, which states "He who hates anyone will endeavor to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself..."

²⁵ Charles Jarrett *Spinoza A Guide for the Perplexed.*

²⁶ On the latter part of *Ethics III* Spinoza tackled other emotions—that which are not basic or fundamental, such as love and hatred, anger and the like. Thus, I say that anger is associated with sadness, for it may have come up or may have been derived from sadness. However, since my primary concern is the three fundamental emotions, I will not be going further anymore on the difference between the primary and other emotions.

²⁷ Note that I did not use the word "non-existence" for using such word might lead us to a more complicated situation, because it is actually a concern of metaphysics.

²⁸ Plato, "The Dialogues of Plato", in *Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. by John Hick (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990).

²⁹ Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988.

³⁰ Though in a part of *Ethics*, Spinoza stated that there are instances that joy is actually an active emotion.

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